NEW YORK Ten years after declaring success in restoring democracy to Haiti, U.S. Marines are back in Port-au-Prince. The last intervention ultimately failed because American forces were sent in with the goal of leaving too quickly.
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The Pentagon would like to do the job right this time. U.S. forces are so overextended elsewhere in the world that long-term American intervention is impossible. Nevertheless, the political framework already in place this time around can lead to a successful outcome for Haiti if the opportunity is seized.
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The Bush administration did the right thing last month by re-engaging the UN Security Council in Haiti's future, and by reaching out to its long-time rival, France. Paris now has 800 troops in Haiti, working with 2,000 U.S. Marines and additional forces from Canada, Chile, and elsewhere, all with UN authorization.
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The forces are there by the official invitation of acting Haitian President Bonifice Alexandre. While this multinational coalition is scheduled to remain in Haiti only through May, to be replaced then by some other UN presence, there are three steps to take now to help ensure long-term success - each involving lessons learned from previous operations.
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First, troops in Haiti should apply a strategy used with some success in Afghanistan by both UN representatives and coalition forces: They should communicate the message that the only purpose of outside intervention is to support the country's own legitimate authorities.
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In Afghanistan in 2002, the UN mission chief, Lakhdar Brahimi, urged the international community to give President Hamid Karzai's government credit for everything that went right, even when outside initiative or funding was really responsible. U.S. civil affairs forces have done just that, for example by making U.S. aid to local Afghan governors contingent upon their publicizing the good works that Karzai's regime has done for their regions.
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In Haiti, the interim government has been formed in accordance with the country's constitution. To cement popular support for democratic rule, it must be made to look effective. Everything outsiders do in the country must be geared toward giving credit to the new legitimate government.
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Second, the overarching goal should be to establish a secure environment that endures after the outsiders leave. U.S. troops are now allowed by the evolving rules of engagement to forcibly disarm criminal gangs and anti-government rebels. This is a good first step, since last time around many Haitians perceived that American troops didn't do enough to ensure public safety. As soon as possible, Haitian police officers should start accompanying outside troops on their patrols and raids.
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Throughout Haiti's troubled history, the police have not been trusted, and political instability has been exacerbated by vigilante justice. The legitimacy of Haiti's police will be boosted when they interact with international troops on a daily basis, restoring order while preserving human rights, and when citizens see them doing so - a lesson that is now being applied in Iraq, as well.
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Third, when the hand-off from the 90-day multinational force in Haiti takes place, it should go not to an abstract "UN presence," but to a UN-authorized operation led by a powerful state with the will to stay the course. The world learned repeatedly in the 1990s that difficult and dangerous peace operations have the greatest chance of success when they are led by states or coalitions with a strong interest in the outcome.
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The United States can't take the lead this time around, but France can. Paris has already declared its readiness to participate in the follow-on stabilization force for Haiti. France is uniquely positioned to assume the lead role because its national gendarmerie force is trained to handle precisely the kind of rioting and civil unrest that Haiti faces.
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Paris also has good diplomatic and geopolitical reasons for taking on this role. Haiti is part of "la Francophonie," the group of French-speaking states (including many former colonies) to which France feels a continuing obligation. France played a significant role in the 1994 intervention for this reason.
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Beyond this, Paris can use its leadership of a successful UN security operation in America's backyard as a point of pride in its efforts to limit American "hyperpower." French command of the follow-on police force in Haiti would serve the interests of both Washington and Paris, while contributing to the ongoing (if quiet) security cooperation the two have managed already in Afghanistan.
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Haiti's needs are clear. Applying lessons learned in peace operations elsewhere since 1994 can ensure those needs are met.
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Kimberly Marten is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University.